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PREVIOUS
SPEAKERS:
Michael Rubenstein
Title:
"Key cases for 2005"
Edited text of a lecture by Michael Rubenstein to the Industrial
Law Society
1. I would like to thank friends and colleagues for their
help in compiling information that forms the basis for this lecture. This
continues to be an exciting time to be involved in employment law. Case
law is coming thick and fast. So much so that I have been able to make
this year’s talk even more forward looking than in previous years.
Whereas previously, I included decisions which had been issued but yet
reported, this year all the cases I am covering had yet to be decided
when this lecture was written.
2. On to the cases. Let’s start with transfer
of undertakings. The recent case law of the European Court of
Justice on whether the Transfers of Undertakings Directive applies where
work is contracted-out draws a sharp distinction between activities which
are “asset-reliant” and activities which are “labour-intensive”.
Güney-Görres v Securicor Aviation Ltd
is a German change of contractor case referred in June 2004, which asks
for guidance on the ingredients of when there is a transfer of assets
within the meaning of the Directive. A key question is whether the transferee
contractor must make independent commercial use of the assets of the original
contractor.
3. Later this year, we can expect the decision of the European Court of
Justice in Celtec v Astley. This is the British
case about the time of transfer. The Court of Appeal overruled the EAT
and held that the wording of the Directive is sufficiently wide in its
terms to embrace a transfer of an undertaking which takes place over a
period – three years in this case - and that the Directive does
not imply that the transfer must take place at a particular moment in
time. The House of Lords referred the question to the ECJ. On 27 January,
the Advocate General gave his Opinion. He suggests that the date of transfer
“does not require there to be a particular point in time at which
all the aspects of the undertaking....are simultaneously transferred.”
4. The Collective Redundancies Directive
requires consultation with worker’s representatives “in good
time”. The Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act,
which implements the Directive, lays down that consultations in advance
of large-scale redundancies must begin at least 90 days before the first
of the dismissals takes effect. Interesting questions of interpretation
under the parallel legislation in Germany have been considered by the
ECJ in Junk v Kuhnel. The key issue is whether
the consultation period runs from the beginning of consultation to when
the notice of dismissal expires, or whether EU law requires that no dismissal
notices can be issued until the consultation period has ended. The Court’s
decision came out on 27 January, after the first two of my lectures. It
is extremely interesting. The ECJ points out: “With regard to the
consultation procedure, this is provided for, within the terms of Article
2(1) of the Directive, ‘with a view to reaching an agreement’.
According to Article 2(2), this procedure must, ‘at least cover
ways and means of avoiding collective redundancies or reducing the number
of workers affected, and of mitigating the consequences by recourse to
accompanying social measures.’ “It thus appears”, the
ECJ says, “that Article 2 of the Directive imposes an obligation
to negotiate.” Commentators have hitherto suggested that this obligation
to consult with a view to reaching agreement was tantamount to negotiation,
but here we have the European Court of Justice saying so in terms. The
ECJ goes on to say: “The effectiveness of such an obligation would
be compromised if an employer was entitled to terminate contracts of employment
during the course of the procedure or even at the beginning thereof. It
would be significantly more difficult for workers’ representatives
to achieve the withdrawal of a decision that has been taken than to secure
the abandonment of a decision that is being contemplated. A contract of
employment may therefore be terminated only after the conclusion of the
consultation procedure, that is to say, after the employer has complied
with the obligations set out in Article 2 of the Directive.” This
decision will be reported in the April IRLR.
5. Several cases on trade union recognition
to mention. On 27 January, the Administrative Court heard R
(on the application of Ultraframe) v Central Arbitration Committee.
This concerns a recognition claim by the GMB. A ballot was held, which
resulted in the union securing a majority of the votes cast, but failing
by four votes to achieve the required threshold of 40% of workers in the
bargaining unit voting in favour of recognition. However, before the results
were announced, the GMB had complained that some members of the bargaining
unit had not received ballot papers. The CAC found that there was a group
who had not received ballots. The employers contended that the CAC nevertheless
had no choice under the Act but to declare the union not to be recognised
on the basis of the results which were communicated by the Qualified Independent
Person because there is no express provision in the Act allowing the CAC
to order a ballot to be re-run. However, the CAC panel (chaired by Professor
Paul Davies) concluded that it had the power to order a re-run of the
ballot. The CAC took the view that any reference in the Schedule to a
“ballot” means a ballot conducted in accordance with the statutory
standards.
6. The NUJ has applied to the Court of Appeal for leave
to appeal against the High Court’s decision in R
(on the application of National Union of Journalists) v Central Arbitration
Committee dismissing their claim for judicial review of the CAC’s
decision that it could not entertain their application for recognition
in respect of journalists employed in Mirror Group Newspapers’ sports
division because the employers had entered into a voluntary recognition
agreement with the British Association of Journalists, even though the
BAJ had at most one member in the bargaining unit. The High Court judge
acknowledged that this was a “lacuna” in the legislation.
7. Let me turn now to health and safety issues. The House
of Lords will be hearing Yorkshire Traction Co v Searby
this year. This is a case in which a bus driver was punched by a passenger.
It is said that assaults like these are a national problem. The judge
upheld the driver’s contention that it was a breach of the Provision
and Use of Work Equipment Regulations not to provide a screen to separate
the driver from passengers. The Court of Appeal overruled that, noting
that screens were not generally supported by bus drivers. It held that
the standard of reasonable care is to be judged as at the date of the
accident, and that the absence of complaint from the workforce is a “substantial
factor” to be taken into account. The House of Lords will decide
whether that is the correct approach.
8. Hartman v South Essex Mental Health
and Community Care NHS Trust is the lead case in six stress at
work cases that were heard at the end of last year, with the aim of producing
one comprehensive judgment on where the law now stands after the decision
of the House of Lords in Barber v Somerset County Council. The Court of
Appeal’s decision was issued on 19 January, as you may have seen.
It will be reported in the April IRLR. One of the most interesting issues
explored from the standpoint of employment law is the Court of Appeal’s
holding that it was not right to attribute to the employer, knowledge
of confidential medical information disclosed by an employee to the employer’s
occupational health department. This may prove significant for DDA cases.
9. Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas
NHS Trust is an interesting case in the Court of Appeal in which
the Protection from Harassment Act is being tested in the context of harassment
at work. An audit co-ordinator claims that he was bullied and harassed
by his female line manager, in part because of his sexual orientation.
He brought an internal complaint of harassment, which was upheld, but
by then he had suffered psychiatric consequences. He is complaining of
a breach by the manager of the Protection from Harassment Act, for which
he says Guys & St. Thomas's are vicariously liable. The claim was
struck out at first instance on grounds that this statute does not permit
vicarious liability. An appeal to the Court of Appeal raises the issue
of principle of whether an employer can be liable for its employee's breach
of statutory duty where the duty is imposed on the employee, but not upon
the employer directly. If the appeal is upheld it would provide an alternative
potential remedy against the employer for employees who claim to have
been bullied at the workplace. Judgment is awaited.
10. Next, working time. Rolled-up holiday pay has proved
to be one of the most controversial issues under the Working Time
Regulations. This refers to a contractual term which provides for a worker’s
holiday pay entitlement to be paid as part of their rate of pay. Various
questions as to whether this is compatible with the Working Time Directive
were referred to the European Court of Justice in Marshalls
Clay Products Ltd v Caulfield. The ECJ has apparently agreed to
give the case an expedited hearing, but “expedited” in ECJ
terms is a relative concept. The reference was registered at the Court
on 16 June 2004, but so far as I am aware, no date has yet been set for
a hearing, or for the earlier reference on the same issue in Robinson-Steele
v R F Retail Services Ltd. Presumably,. however, both cases will
be heard in 2005.
11. The other key area of controversy under the Working
Time Regulations relates to annual holidays. Commissioners
of Inland Revenue v Gray and Ainsworth is due to be heard by the
Court of Appeal in March. This case challenges two existing authorities:
Kigass Aero Components v Brown, which held that a worker on long-term
sick leave can claim four weeks’ holiday pay under the Working Time
Regulations for a period when they have been off work sick; and List
Design Group Ltd v Douglas, which held that the right to receive
a payment in lieu of annual leave can be claimed as wages under s.13 of
the Employment Rights Act, and thus be linked back to previous years to
form a series of deductions within s.23 of the Employment Rights Act.
The Inland Revenue is arguing that the only remedy in such a case is a
claim under the Working Time Regulations, which does not have the linking
series provision. The EAT has been staying appeals on these points pending
the Court of Appeal’s decision.
12. There will be several important decisions in 2005 on
the vexed question of “who is an employee”?.
In Bunce v Postworth Ltd t/a Skyblue, the applicant
was a welder who entered into an “associate” agreement with
Skyblue, an employment business, and was then assigned to Carillion Rail.
The agreement with Skyblue provided expressly that: “the failure
by the employment business to obtain suitable assignments for the associate
shall not give rise to any liability on the part of the employment business
and the associate recognises that there may be periods between assignments
when no work is available.” It also provided that “the associate
shall not be obliged to accept an assignment offered by the employment
business.” Mr Bunce sought to bring an unfair dismissal complaint,
but the EAT held that there was insufficient mutuality of obligations
for there to be a contract of service. The case is going to the Court
of Appeal.
13. The EAT has reserved judgment in Muscat
v Cable & Wireless plc. This is a test case on the employment
status of agency workers post-Dacas. One of the points of interest
is how the dicta in Dacas suggesting that tribunals should look
for an implied contract of employment in agency cases can be reconciled
with the traditional test of necessity for the implication of a contract.
14. Royal National Lifeboat Institution
v. Bushaway is a “who is an employee” case to be heard
by the EAT. The novel point here is that the relevant documents, all of
which stated that the claimant was not an employee, contained an “entire
agreement clause”. The question for the EAT is whether the existence
of such a clause prevents an individual from relying on the Dacas
principle that a contractual relationship can be implied.
15. The House of Lords is due to hear Percy
v Church of Scotland Board of National Mission. This a claim by
an ordained associate minister in the Angus glens who was suspended from
duty following allegations that she had a sexual affair with a married
elder. She sought to bring a claim under the Sex Discrimination Act on
grounds that similar actions had not been taken against male ministers
who had been known to have extra-marital sexual relationships. The tribunal
and courts below have all held that the applicant was appointed to an
office of a spiritual nature, and that there was no contract of employment
giving rise to rights enforceable under civil law.
16. Kitchen v Highways Agency
is a test case about the status of temporary agency workers in the civil
service which is being heard this month in the Leeds employment tribunal.
17. Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal has been given
in Aziz v. Embassy of the Republic of Yemen.
This concerns state immunity and raises two main questions:
first, are the EAT decisions in Gamal-Eldin and Abdelghafar
correct insofar as they suggest that respondents who are held by tribunals
to have submitted to the jurisdiction are not bound by normal rules of
procedure in seeking to overturn the tribunals' rulings? Secondly, in
practical terms, how is a foreign state to be regarded as taking steps
in proceedings, ie who has to authorise the taking of the step? Is it
only the ambassador or his deputy, or is the potential cast list wider?
18. If an employee is dismissed in breach of contract
with less than one year’s service, can she claim damages for wrongful
dismissal on the basis that she lost the chance of recovering unfair dismissal
compensation that she would have received if she had been given her contractual
notice of termination? This has been a long-running debate amongst employment
lawyers. A strong argument can be made that such damages accord with the
general principle that an employee who sustains a loss by reason of the
employer’s breach of contract is to be placed, so far as possible,
in the same position as if the contract had been performed and they had
been given the notice provided for in the contract. In Harper
v Virgin Net Ltd, however, the Court of Appeal ruled that such
a claim cannot be brought. The main reason given was a policy one: the
statutory unfair dismissal scheme ever since 1975 has provided for the
effective date of termination to be extended until the end of the statutory
minimum notice rather than any longer contractual period of notice. The
House of Lords has now given leave to appeal and the case will be heard
on 31 October.
19. The dispute over the territorial jurisdiction
of employment tribunals will continue to be prominent this year. The House
of Lords will hear Lawson v Serco Ltd on 14
and 15 November. This is an unfair dismissal case, in which the Court
of Appeal took a relatively strict line and held that the test under the
Employment Rights Act, where an employee works overseas, is whether the
employment was in Great Britain. In Lawson, where a British employee
worked on Ascension Island for a British company, this criterion produced
a straightforward answer: the tribunal did not have jurisdiction to hear
the complaint.
20. Crofts v Cathay Pacific and
Botham v Ministry of Defence will be heard together
in the Court of Appeal on 14 and 15 March. These cases concern the territorial
scope of an employment tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear claims of
breach of contract, and also the availability of plea of “forum
non conveniens” in employment tribunals. In the Cathay Pacific
case, the EAT held that the breach of contract jurisdiction is the same
as the jurisdiction in the ordinary courts, and is different from the
jurisdiction under statute. The EAT also upheld the tribunal’s power
to find that Hong Kong was the proper forum for hearing claims by airline
pilots who were based in Hong Kong under contracts governed by Hong Kong
law. In Botham, the appellant was employed as a UK-based youth
worker by the MoD at various locations in Germany. His letter of appointment
and contract of employment incorporated references to UK employment protection
legislation. Following his dismissal, a tribunal dismissed his claim for
unfair and wrongful dismissal on the basis that it was bound by Lawson.
However, the applicant is now contending in the Court of Appeal that the
Lawson decision was given per incuriam.
22. Holodny v Norimet Ltd and Prokhorov
is a claim of religious discrimination and also whistleblowing unfair
dismissal. The first respondent is an English company, which is part of
the Norlisk Nickel group of businesses based in Russia. In January there
was a preliminary hearing in the employment tribunal on the novel point
of whether the discrimination legislation allows an individual domiciled
and resident in Russia to be joined as an individual respondent to an
English tribunal claim. I understand the tribunal has now decided that
it does have jurisdiction.
23. The EAT over the past year or so has taken a more relaxed
attitude as to time limits for presenting complaints. Marks
& Spencer plc v Williams-Ryan illustrates this in an unfair
dismissal context. The applicant, who was summarily dismissed
prior to 1 October 2004, was advised by a CAB to exhaust the employer’s
internal appeal procedure before presenting a complaint. Marks & Spencer
told her she had a separate right to claim unfair dismissal and before
the time limit expired, a former colleague gave her an originating application
and a brochure which set out the time limits, which she did not read.
The EAT, however, held that it was not reasonably practicable for the
complaint to be brought in time because she believed, as a result of the
CAB advice, that she had to await the outcome of the internal appeal before
making a complaint to the tribunal. This decision is being challenged
in the Court of Appeal on grounds that it marks a significant shift away
from previous authority which held that where an employee has knowledge
of the right to claim unfair dismissal, then she is obliged to find out
about the time limit. It also is said to be inconsistent with the principle
that, for unfair dismissal purposes, the failure of skilled advisers to
give proper legal advice does not provide just cause for extending time.
24. One of the controversial issues that is bound to arise
under the 2003 Regulations prohibiting discrimination on grounds of religion
or belief is the position of employees who, for religious reasons, do
not want to work on Sundays. So far I am not aware of any decisions on
this point, but some employees who were dismissed for refusing to work
Sundays on religious grounds have attempted to use unfair dismissal law,
buttressed more recently by human rights principles. Copsey
v WBB Devon Clays is a case brought by an evangelical Christian
with the support of the Keep Sunday Special Campaign. Mr Copsey refused
to work a seven-day shift system which had been introduced following consultation
with the unions and with the support of a majority of the employees. He
was dismissed after he rejected offers of alternative employment which
did not have a working pattern requiring Sunday work. His unfair dismissal
claim was unsuccessful at both the ET and the EAT. In the EAT, it was
argued that whether the employers acted reasonably in dismissing now had
to be interpreted in light of the right to freedom of religion under Article
9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The EAT said that even if
that was the case, account had to be taken of the 1987 decision of the
European Commission on Human Rights in Stedman v United Kingdom.
In that case, in which a Sunday working requirement was challenged, the
European Commission on Human Rights took the narrow view that the employee’s
rights under the Convention were not infringed because she could seek
alternative employment elsewhere which would allow her to observe the
Sabbath. In Copsey, Mr Justice Rimer said that “we regard
[that decision] as sound in principle [and] directly in point..... If
the employee takes the view that his employer’s work requirements
are incompatible with the due exercise and manifestation of his religious
beliefs, he is entitled to resign.... As he had that choice, nothing that
Devon Clays did or proposed amounted to an infringement of his Article
9 rights.” Mr Copsey will try to persuade the Court of Appeal that
Stedman should not be followed. The Court of Appeal will also
have the opportunity, should it choose to, of revisiting its decision
in X v Y on how Convention rights are to be taken into account
in deciding whether a dismissal is unfair. The case is likely to be heard
in the first half of this year.
25. The Court of Appeal will be hearing Awotona
v South Tyneside NHS Trust in April. This case will consider the
law relating failure to comply with an order for reinstatement. It is
being argued that s.114 of the Employment Rights Act creates a debt, not
a compensatory award, and if a reinstatement order is not complied with,
compensation should be paid as from the date of dismissal rather than
from the date of the tribunal hearing.
26. Bangs v Connex South Eastern
is one of the four cases in which Mr Justice Burton gave guidance on the
effect of delay by an employment tribunal in promulgating
its decision. The cases were reported under the lead name of Kwamin
v Abbey National. In Bangs, extended reasons finding that
the applicant had been discriminated against on grounds of race were promulgated
over a year after the parties exchanged submissions following the hearing.
The EAT allowed the employer’s appeal. The Court of Appeal gave
its judgment on 27 January. It takes the view that unreasonable delay
is not a question of law and not in itself an independent ground of appeal.
However, serious delay can amount to a procedural error where there is
a real risk that failure to promulgate the decision within a reasonable
time gave rise to a real risk that the party was deprived of the right
to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Human Rights Act. This decision
will also be reported in the April IRLR.
27. Matthews v Kent & Medway Towns
Fire Authority is the test case on the Part-time Workers
Regulations 2000, brought by retained fire fighters alleging that they
have been less favourably treated than whole-time fire fighters, especially
as regards their exclusion from the Firemen’s Pension Scheme. The
Court of Appeal held that retained and full-time firefighters are employed
under the same type of contract for the purposes of the Regulations, but
they dismissed the complaint on grounds that they do not do the “same
or broadly similar work”, in that, in addition to the fighting of
fires and responding to other emergencies, there are other job functions
carried out by full-time but not retained firefighters, including educational,
preventive and administrative tasks. The House of Lords will be hearing
an appeal later in the year. A cross-appeal by the employers on the “same
type of contract” issue is also anticipated.
28. Budden and others v Bedford NHS Trust
is an interesting test case scheduled for 6 weeks in an employment tribunal
in April/May. It concerns the application of the Part-time Worker Regulations
to hospital consultants who, by virtue of the level of private work undertaken,
are placed on contracts styled “maximum part-time contracts”
at 10/11ths of normal salary, but are subject to an obligation to devote
all their working time to the NHS.
29. Pregnancy-related illness and sick
pay is the issue currently before the European Court of Justice in North-Western
Health Board v McKenna. This Irish reference concerns an employee
who had to have sick leave for nearly the whole term of pregnancy because
of a pregnancy-related illness. The employer’s sick pay scheme provided
for six months on full pay and six months on half pay in any period of
four years. Pregnancy-related illness was treated like any other illness.
As a result of her pregnancy-related illness, Ms McKenna’s pay was
reduced to half-pay during her pregnancy. She brought a claim that to
treat pregnancy-related illness in the same way as any other illness was
discrimination on grounds of sex contrary to the Equal Treatment Directive.
She argued that there should be separate sick leave provisions to deal
with pregnancy-related illnesses. The Equality Officer upheld the claim
and ruled that Ms McKenna should be paid what she would have received
if her pregnancy-related illness had not been treated as sick pay. The
Labour Court referred the issue to the ECJ. Both the Irish Government
and the UK Government have intervened in the case and argued that there
was no discrimination because pregnancy-related illnesses and other illnesses
were treated the same way, and that any other conclusion would have very
damaging financial consequences. The Advocate General gave his Opinion
on 2 December 2004. He considers that the provisions are discriminatory.
He sees the operative principle as being that “any unfavourable
treatment of a pregnant woman which is the consequence of her being pregnant
constitutes discrimination on grounds of sex because pregnancy, of its
nature, affects women workers alone.” On that basis, setting pregnancy-related
absences against sick pay affects women alone and thus is directly discriminatory.
If the Court itself agrees, it would mean that if an employer provided
sickness benefit, a woman off work because of a pregnancy-related illness
seemingly would be entitled to unlimited sick leave at the relevant rate
of sickness benefit during her pregnancy, at least until her maternity
leave started.
30. Hoyland v Asda is a Scottish
case regarding failure to pay a bonus to an employee who was absent because
of a pregnancy-related illness. It will be heard by the EAT on 21 and
22 February.
31. Last year, in Alabaster v Woolwich
plc and Secretary of State for Social Security,
the European Court of Justice held that UK statutory maternity pay legislation
does not comply with EU law in that a woman who receives a pay increase
before the start of her maternity leave is entitled to have the increase
taken into consideration in the calculation by her employer of the earnings-related
element of her statutory maternity pay, even though the pay rise was not
backdated to the relevant reference period for calculating her entitlement
under the Statutory Maternity Pay (General) Regulations. Under the current
rules, a pay increase during maternity leave is only taken into account
in the SMP calculation if it is backdated. The case is going back to the
Court of Appeal in February on the issue of whether there is jurisdiction
to hear the claim under the Equal Pay Act, or directly under Article 141,
in circumstances where there is no male comparator because only women
get pregnant.
32. In Rodway v South Central Trains,
the EAT overruled an employment tribunal and held that an employee cannot
take one day’s parental leave to look after his child because the
minimum period of leave is a week. The Court of Appeal will consider whether
that is correct in March.
33. Where an employee who has been unlawfully discriminated
against is unfairly dismissed, does the dismissal breaks the chain of
causation so that any further loss results from the dismissal and is to
be assessed as part of unfair dismissal compensation, subject to the statutory
upper limit? That is the issue in Prison Service v
Beart (No.2). The EAT held that a wrongdoer should not benefit
from his second wrong, and that the applicant was entitled to full compensation
for disability discrimination. This case, which is in
the March IRLR, raises interesting points of principle on causation in
discrimination cases and the hearing has been expedited. I understand
it is likely to be heard by the Court of Appeal in the next few months.
34. The Court of Appeal on 25 and 26 January heard the appeal
in Murphy v Slough Borough Council and Governing Body
of Langley Wood School. The EAT held that a DDA claim by a teacher
employed by a local education authority at a school with a delegated budget
must be brought against the governors of the school at which the teacher
works, rather than against the local authority responsible for the school.
This is because of the Education (Modifications of Enactments Relating
to Employment) Order 1999. This provides that in a school in which the
governing bodies have a delegated budget, the governing body is to be
treated as if they were an employer in respect of any application to an
employment tribunal. The practical effect of this ruling in a DDA context
is that the employment tribunal will look at the resources of the school
rather than the LEA when considering the question of reasonable adjustments.
It will be argued that the 1999 Order does not exempt the LEA from duties
under the DDA and that the LEA may be under a duty to make reasonable
adjustments even though the staff powers are conferred on the governing
body.
35. Equal pay cases will be prominent in 2005, especially
as regards public sector claims. Cadman v Health &
Safety Executive is the controversial equal pay decision on the
use of service-based pay scales. The EAT held that because of the European
Court’s decision in the Danfoss case in 1989, use of the
factor of length of service does not need to be specifically justified
in a case where the employer is distinguishing between full-time workers.
The Court of Appeal has now made a reference to the European Court of
Justice on whether the principle set out in Danfoss has been
overtaken by subsequent decisions.
36. Robertson v DEFRA held that
an equal pay claim cannot be brought under Article 141 by civil servants
in one Government department using comparators in a different Government
department. The EAT said that the fact that the Crown is the employer
for both departments is not sufficient for the purposes of Article 141
to make them part of the same “service” and thus a single
employer. Instead, the EAT held that each individual department is the
“service” for the purposes of Article 141. The case was heard
in the Court of Appeal on 14-15 October, and the decision is awaited.
37. Equal pay cases brought in respect of the prison services
are continuing to generate considerable appellate litigation. Last year
in IRLR we reported Bailey v Home Office, which raises the issue
of the circumstances in which an employer has to objectively justify a
difference in pay between two groups employed on work of equal value if
the difference has arisen because of a history of different arrangements
for collective bargaining. The case concerns a series of claims by white
collar workers in the prison service, who are claiming equal pay with
various grades of predominantly male posts rated as equivalent. The Home
Office accepted that where the applicants were in grades which are predominantly
female, they would have to objectively justify any variation in pay or
less favourable terms. However, in this part of the group of claimants,
the applicants are higher executive officers, a grade which is composed
of approximately half men and half women. Did that amount to evidence
of prima facie discrimination, so as to require the employers to justify
the difference in pay? The EAT has ruled that it did not. It said that
in considering whether a disparity of pay which has arisen as between
two work groups by reason of a history of different arrangements for collective
bargaining evidences sex discrimination, a prima facie case will be established
if the advantaged group is predominantly male and the disadvantaged group
is predominantly female. But, according to the EAT: “Where...the
advantaged group is predominantly male and the composition of the disadvantaged
group is neutral in gender terms, then the situation may not be fair,
but it is not prima facie discriminatory on grounds of sex.” An
appeal is scheduled for 10 and 11 March under the name of Clements
and Pollak v Home Office.
38. The EAT will be hearing an appeal on 15-17 March against
the substantive decision of the employment tribunal in the prison service
equal pay cases. Somewhat confusingly, this is currently called Home
Office v Bailey and others. The Home Office is appealing several
issues. These include whether there is an “area of tolerance”
for whether work can be regarded as rated equivalent under a job evaluation
scheme, so as to encompass where the work of the comparators have been
given slightly higher scores than that of the applicant. There are also
appeals against the tribunal’s rejection of various material factor
defences put forward by the Home Office, including the role of length
of service and whether the genuine material factor of unsocial working
hours was capable of justifying only a proportion of the difference in
basic pay between the applicants and their comparators.
39. In Preston No.3, reported under the name Powerhouse
Retail v Burroughs, the Court of Appeal ruled that where there
has been a relevant transfer under the Transfer of Undertakings Regulations,
time begins to run under s.2(4) of the Equal Pay Act, for the purposes
of an equal pay claim against a transferor, from the date of the relevant
TUPE transfer. It overruled the EAT, which had held that time does not
begin to run until the end of an employee’s employment with the
transferee. The claimants have applied to the House of Lords for permission
to appeal on that point.
40. Equal pay claims have been brought against various councils
in North East England by cleaners and home helps claiming bonuses, attendance
allowances and other enhancements earned by men alleged to be employed
on work of equal value as gardeners, refuse workers and road workers.
One of these cases, from Newcastle, has already reached the EAT under
the name Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council v Degnan,
and is to be reported in March IRLR. The claimants wanted to compare themselves
to refuse workers for the purpose of the attendance allowance and to the
gardeners for the purpose of the bonus, in effect to “cherry pick”.
That would have given the women higher pay overall than their comparators.
This evidently troubled the EAT, which found a solution by controversially
holding that these allowances were not separate terms for the purpose
of equal pay claims and had to be aggregated together with the basic rate
in order to calculate an hourly rate for comparison purposes. That point
will go to the Court of Appeal in April. Meanwhile, hearings in Newcastle
and Thornaby on various dates are scheduled, as is another appeal before
the EAT. One of the other issues raised by these cases is whether injury
to feelings awards can be made in equal pay cases.
41. One of my hobby horses has been the failure of the appellate
courts to come to terms with the changes made to the burden of proof in
discrimination cases. During 2004, this issue featured
in several reported cases, and there will be continuing litigation in
2005. Two decisions of His Honour Judge McMullen QC on this point have
been appealed and will be heard together on 7 and 8 February. They are
Wong v Igen Ltd and the reported case of Emokpae
v Chamberlin Solicitors. Both cases raise points about the evidence
needed to justify a shift in the burden of proof. A third case has now
been joined to this and they will all be heard together. The case is Webster
v Brunel University, a decision of Mr Justice Burton in December,
which focused on what is a prima facie case sufficient to shift the burden.
All three statutory commissions are jointly intervening in the case to
address the relevant principles relating to the burden of proof, such
as the level of evidence needed to establish a prima facie case.
42. Another EAT decision on the burden of proof which is
expected to go to the Court of Appeal that is not on your handout is Madarassy
v Nomura International, a City trader case which received quite
a lot of publicity. This is a decision of Mr Justice Nelson of 16 December
2004, in which the EAT reviews the case law and decides to rely on the
comments of Lord Justice Simon Brown (as he then was) several years ago
in Nelson v Carillion that the change in the burden of proof
did no more than codify the pre-existing position. The EOC is supporting
an appeal, which will focus on the level of evidence required to shift
the burden. The appeal will also consider the employer’s duty to
carry out risk assessments of pregnant women.
43. Meanwhile, Mrs Justice Cox has reserved judgment in the EAT in Adebayo
v Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, a case which also looks at the
burden of proof provisions.
44. Frater v Ministry of Defence
concerns the issue of whether it is sufficient to call as a witness one
member of a recruitment panel to discharge the onus of proof under s.63A
of the Sex Discrimination Act where each member of the recruitment panel
scored candidates individually and no one was nominated as a spokesman
for the panel as a whole. The EAT will hear the case on 17 March.
45. Hardy & Hansons plc v Lax
will be heard by the Court of Appeal in April or May. An employment tribunal
found that the employers indirectly discriminated against Ms Lax by not
allowing her to job share her post as a retail recruitment manager after
she became pregnant. Permission to appeal has been given on the basis
that the test of justification for indirect discrimination, correctly
construed, is similar to the band of reasonable responses test for unfair
dismissal. It is argued that the tribunal must allow the employer a measure
of discretion and cannot substitute its own view for that of the employer.
Lord Justice Peter Gibson thought that this raised a point of “some
general importance”, as indeed it would should the appeal succeed.
There is also a cross-appeal in this case of interest. After she went
on maternity leave, Ms Lax was made redundant. The tribunal dismissed
her claim under reg.10 of the Maternity and Parental Leave Regulations
that she should have been offered a job share as an alternative to redundancy
on the basis that the new contract would have been substantially less
favourable to her in terms of hours and pay. It will be argued that the
wishes of the employee have to be taken into account in deciding whether
the alternative vacancy was suitable, and that an employee who wishes
to work reduced hours, and thus receive less pay, is entitled to regard
the terms as not substantially less favourable to her.
46. Saggar v Ministry of Defence
is a Court of Appeal case to be heard on 8 and 9 February, which considers
the extent to which the Race Relations Act applies overseas. The case
was brought under the Act before its scope was broadened by the 2003 amendments,
but some of the issues of principle raised may continue to be relevant,
such as when do you assess whether a person is employed in Great Britain:
at the start of the contract, at the time of the discrimination, or retrospectively?
47. St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council
v Derbyshire is the case in which the local authority wrote to
catering staff who had brought an equal pay claim warning them that if
they were successful, free school meals might have to be abolished and
there could be large-scale redundancies. The EAT held that this amounted
to unlawful victimisation. It rejected an argument that the letters were
no more than routine letters written by parties to litigation and that
in order to amount to victimisation, the letters would have had to contain
threats directly against the individual applicants, such as that they
would be dismissed or demoted if they continued with the claims. An appeal
against this will be heard by the Court of Appeal in May.
48. BMA v Chaudhary is the long-running
race discrimination case about alleged discrimination by the BMA in not
supporting Dr Chaudhary’s allegations of discrimination against
various professional and regulatory bodies. It led to the highest-ever
award in a race discrimination case, £814,000. In 2004, there was
an unsuccessful appeal by the BMA to the EAT and the case is now going
to the Court of Appeal. Amongst the issues to be considered are whether
there is indirect discrimination when the respondent fails to offer a
benefit which particular ethnic groups would make use of more frequently
than others. Another issue relates to the award of compensation for indirect
discrimination. The statute provides that no compensation should be awarded
where indirect discrimination was not “intentional”, but what
is meant by “intentional” in this context?
49. The House of Lords was asked some months ago to give
leave to appeal in Rutherford v Secretary of State
for Trade and Industry No.2 but has yet to decide whether to hear
the case.
50. On 8 March, however, the EAT will be hearing the
appeal in Chanin v British Airways.
This is the test case alleging that BA’s retirement age of 55 for
cabin crews is indirectly discriminatory against women. The employment
tribunal found that there was adverse impact, but that the indirect discrimination
was justified by reason of the employer’s economic and organisational
interests, and in particular the cost implications of changing the retirement
age, given that pay was service-linked. This case can also be seen in
part as a precursor to the kinds of cases that will arise under age discrimination
legislation, where retirement ages under 65 will have to be justified
on their merits.
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